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In this paper, we present indirect evidence that the IMF’s insistence on foreign 
control of two large nationwide Korean banks in exchange for short-term support during 
the 1997 financial crisis helped restrain soft related lending practices.  News signaling the 
likely sale of a bank to a foreign financial institution yields an average daily decrease of 
about 2% in the stock price of related borrowers. News indicating difficulty in finding an 
interested foreign investor generates an increase in the stock price of related borrowers of 
about the same magnitude. These signals have larger impacts on less-profitable, less-
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1.  Introduction: Soft Related Lending 
 
Stable, long-term, relationships between banks and their clients are often claimed to 
be beneficial because they allow banks to acquire private information that permits more 
efficient debt contracts to be transacted.  In economies having less developed financial 
sectors, bank-centered systems are considered to be preferable to market arrangements 
that require considerable supporting infrastructure. Rajan and Zingales (1998) maintain 
that a legal system supporting prompt and unbiased enforcement of contracts by the 
courts is a pre-condition for the viability of a market-based system. In 19
th century New 
England, Lamoreaux (1986) argues that pocket banks raising the necessary external funds 
for growing firms filled a vacuum in the underdeveloped financial system.  Haber (2004) 
considers related lending to have been a second-best outcome in Mexico during the early 
development period when the financial infrastructure was nascent. On the positive side, 
related lending can solve problems of information and missing institutions. 
On the negative side, related lending is fraught with incentive problems that may lead 
to inefficient, and even fraudulent, insider lending, tunneling, and looting. Laeven (2001) 
finds that large shareholders of Russian banks were able to extract loans on favorable 
terms at the expense of the bank’s equity. Cull, Matesova and Shirley (2002) demonstrate 
that the Czech Republic’s voucher privatization program, which resulted in interlocking 
ownership between banks and firms, facilitated asset stripping because firms had access 
to soft bank loans.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2003) use detailed loan 
data from Mexican banks to show that, compared with unrelated loans, related loans have 
lower interest rates, which are less sensitive to risk, and have a higher probability of 
becoming nonperforming loans.  Peek and Rosengren (2003) show that Japanese banks   3
extend related loans to financially weak borrowers and that this tendency to prop up weak 
firms is strongest among the weakest banks. Finally, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue 
that the Asian financial crisis of 1997 is attributable partly to the prevalence of related 
lending and the reluctance of main banks to cut off funds to weak zombie borrowers.  
Hence, soft related lending, defined as lending on favorable non-market terms to 
privileged clients, tends to be inefficient and to increase the costs of resolution in the 
event of a banking crisis. 
Jeon and Miller (2004) identify Korea as the Asian country that best illustrates this 
problem because its macroeconomic indicators did not suggest any severe problems 
before the crisis. However, the permissive regulatory practice of the Korean government 
allowed the banking sector to continue to provide funds to unviable large conglomerates, 
chaebols. In particular, the lending practices of two insolvent Korean banks, Korea First 
Bank and Seoul Bank, were identified.  An article in the Financial Times on January 30, 
1997 reports that “Korea First, with shareholders' equity of Won 1,800bn (£1.3bn), lent 
almost Won 1,100bn to Hanbo.”  A later article in the Financial Times on  February 7, 
1997 reports: “The former Seoul Bank chief, Mr Song Hong-kyun, was arrested in 
December and accused of taking $ 244,100 (£150,000) in kickbacks after extending 
preferential loans to four companies.” Toward the end of December 1997, the Korean 
government and the IMF agreed on a letter of intent that singles out these two banks for 
recapitalization and restructuring in preparation for sales to foreign financial institutions. 
Such an ownership change was intended to put an end to soft related lending practices in 
both banks.   4
In this paper, we use the experience with implementing this program for these two 
large Korean banks as an experiment to investigate the value of soft related lending to 
recipient companies. In particular, we examine the impact of news that provides 
information about the likely change in bank ownership, with its expected end of soft 
lending practices, on the stock prices of related companies. We begin with the 
nationalization of the two Korean banks on December 9, 1997 and identify eight other 
pertinent news events through December 23, 1999 when Korea First Bank is sold to 
Newbridge Capital Group. Our first objective is to evaluate the impact of these news 
events on the abnormal stock returns of Korean companies having one of these two banks 
as their main bank.  The maintained hypothesis is that a foreign owner will not continue 
lending practices that are detrimental to the financial performance of the bank, i.e., soft 
related lending.  Hence, we expect to find a negative response in the stock prices of 
companies attached to the bank to news indicating that a sale to a foreign financial 
institution is more likely and a positive response to news suggesting that such a sale is 
delayed or even in jeopardy. In addition, we investigate whether these effects tend to be 
stronger for less-profitable firms and for those firms having less liquidity and relying 
more on short-term bank loans. 
Our paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides a detailed description of 
the news events that we identify as pertinent to our study of the impact of foreign 
ownership on soft related lending and specifies their expected effects on the stock prices 
of the related borrowers.  Section 3 discusses the data and describes the methodology that 
we use.  In section 4, we present and discuss the estimates of abnormal returns for related 
borrowers attributed to each event for the baseline model.  In this section, we report   5
robustness checks in which we control for industry effects; we also examine the 
sensitivity of the results to the selection of the group of borrowers identified as related to 
the two banks and to the estimation period.  Section 5 contains the results of the 
regressions that take into account three firm characteristics, namely, profitability, 
liquidity, and bank reliance, to investigate differential impacts of the news on abnormal 
returns for firms of different types. Section 6 concludes with a brief summary of the 
results and some policy implications.  
2.  The News Events and Their Expected Effects 
In return for IMF standby credit support at the end of 1997, the Korean government 
agreed to change its bank regulatory policy from forbearance to prompt corrective action. 
Two banks, Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank, were singled out as major offenders in 
continuing to provide loans to insolvent related borrowers. The Korean government 
agreed to change the governance of these two banks and recapitalize them in preparation 
for sales to foreign financial institutions.  Over the next two years, a series of events 
occurred that resulted in one of the banks, Korea First Bank, being sold to a foreign 
owner but the other, Seoul Bank, being left at the altar.  We intend to use these events to 
examine the effect of soft related lending on the value of client companies of these two 
banks. The relevant news events are discussed below and their expected impact is 
specified. We obtained the announcement dates from a comprehensive search of the 
Lexus-Nexus database, which includes the Financial Times, AFX News-Asia, and the 
Korea Times. Table 1 provides a brief chronology of the relevant news events.
1  
The first three events constitute the initial steps in preparing Korea First Bank and 
Seoul Bank for sale to a foreign owner, which would result in the end of soft related 
                                                 
1 We use Korean dates for all events.   6
lending in these banks. On December 9, 1997, 
 the Korean government announced its 
purchase of 59% of the shares of these two banks resulting in their partial nationalization.  
In return for this capital injection, the government required the banks to undertake 
stringent restructuring. On the same day, bank officials announced that they would lay off 
1,500 workers over the next 2 years. This event indicates a critical change in government 
policy toward these two banks from forbearance to more stringent prompt corrective 
action.
2  Hence, we expect to find a negative impact on the stock prices of related 
borrowers. 
The second event is the signing of the letter of intent with the IMF on December 26, 
1997.  In negotiations with the Korean government, the IMF insisted that the banking 
sector be restructured and that foreign investors be allowed to take majority stakes in 
domestic Korean banks. In the letter of intent, the Korean government agreed that the 
bank of Korea would provide no short-term liquidity to financial institutions. In addition, 
the government assumed complete control of insolvent banks and agreed to remove the 
existing management. Finally, the government agreed to appoint outside experts to 
oversee the restructuring and privatization of Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank.
3  Based 
on these conditions, we expect this event to have a negative effect on the market value of 
related borrowers. The third event is the actual appointment of Morgan Stanley as lead 
manager of the restructuring and privatization of both banks on April 22, 1998. Although 
this move is likely to have been anticipated because of the agreement with the IMF, we 
check to see if it has any independent effect on related borrowers because action speaks 
louder than words in financial markets.  
                                                 
2 Prior to this, the Korean government had been purchasing non-performing loans through the Korean Asset 
Management Company (KAMCO) without imposing any stringent restructuring requirements on banks. 
3 See the IMF website (http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/122497.htm) for further details.   7
The next important news event is a serious setback in the privatization process. On 
November 5, 1998, a delay in the privatizations of both Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank 
was announced.
4  In the letter of intent with the IMF, the Korean government promised 
that these two banks would be sold by November 15, 1998.  However, the government 
encountered difficulty in obtaining bids from foreign financial institutions so that it 
decided to postpone the sales until the end of January.  Postponement based on a lack of 
foreign interest could signal to related borrowers that lending practices will not change as 
drastically as they would have if foreign ownership of the two banks were imminent. 
Hence, we expect this news to have a positive impact of the stock prices of related 
borrowers.  
The next three events occur on different dates for the two banks but we consider each 
as a single news item. Momentum is regained with the signings of memoranda of 
understanding for the sales of Korea First Bank to Newbridge Capital Group and Seoul 
Bank to HSBC on December 28, 1998 and February 22, 1999, respectively.  Unlike the 
postponement news, this fifth event should have a negative impact on the stock prices of 
related borrowers because it signals a renewed commitment to pursue the sales of both 
banks to foreign owners. Although the memoranda of understanding were signed, 
negotiations for the sales of the two banks stalled. In fact, the government and the foreign 
financial institutions failed twice to reach agreement by the deadlines specified in the 
memoranda. In the case of Korea First Bank, the government and Newbridge Capital 
failed to reach any agreement by April 30, 1999, which was the first deadline, or by May 
12, 1999, which was the second deadline.  The corresponding missed deadlines for Seoul 
Bank were May 31, 1999 and June 28, 1999.  These two events indicate continuing 
                                                 
4 See “Korean sell-offs postponed” Financial Times. November 5, 1998   8
difficulty with finalizing the agreements to sell the banks to foreign owners and, as such, 
these setbacks signal to related borrowers that soft lending practices may continue in the 
immediate future.  Hence, we expect each event to have a positive impact on the stock 
price of related borrowers.  
The final two events relate to the privatization of only Korea First Bank and its effect 
on related borrowers.  Negotiations for the purchase of Seoul Bank by HSBC broke down 
irreconcilably and this bank’s promised sale to a foreign owner was abandoned. In 
November 2002, which is outside of our sample period, the Korean government arranged 
a takeover of Seoul Bank by Hana Bank, which is a nationwide Korean bank with about a 
third of its shares held by foreign investors. Returning to the privatization of Korea First 
Bank, Newbridge Capital Group agreed to acquire the bank on July 1, 1999.  The 
transaction was actually consummated on December 23, 1999.  Both of these events 
indicate the end of soft related lending for the related borrowers of this bank.  Hence, we 
expect to see the stock prices of companies using Korea First Bank as their main bank to 
decline in response to both events.  However, invoking the principle that actions speak 
louder than words, our presumption is stronger for the latter of the two events.   
3.  The Data and the Methodology 
3.1 Data 
To estimate the abnormal returns of related companies associated with the news 
events concerning the likelihood of foreign takeovers of Korea First Bank and Seoul 
Bank, we run a standard market-model regression adapting methodology common to 
event studies, the literature on which is surveyed in MacKinlay (1997). Our sample 
consists of daily stock prices from November 1, 1997 to February 29, 2000 for publicly   9
traded firms taken from the University of Rhode Island’s Pacific Basin Capital Market 
Research Center (PACAP) database. PACAP also provides annual balance sheets and 
income statements for these companies from 1996 to 2000. We use this information to 
construct measures of firm characteristics.  
To establish the main bank links, we use the annual publication Korean Company 
Information (Kankoku Kaisha Joho), which identifies the most important bank for each 
Korean firm. In our baseline model, we use the 2000 edition and merge PACAP data with 
this information. Table A1 of the Appendix identifies the number of firms related to each 
of the eleven nationwide Korean banks from the 1998 and the 2000 editions. The entries 
along the diagonal are the number of firms that stay with the same main bank over this 
two-year period. We use the main bank relationships in 2000 in our baseline model to 
include firms that that became associated with the bank during the data period but to 
exclude any firms that might have been operating in 1998 but were bankrupt in 2000. The 
sample for the baseline model consists of 106 firms for which we have information about 
stock market returns and that identify one of the two banks as their main bank. 
3.2. Empirical Model 
We regress the daily changes in the stock market prices of firms on the daily change 
in a market index given by Korean Stock Price Index (KOSPI) and on dummy variables 
that represent three-day event windows consisting of the event date plus one day before 
and one day after its occurrence.
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5 We experimented with five-day and eleven-day windows in the baseline model; our main results are not 
changed qualitatively in either case.   10
where  it R  is the change in the stock price of firm i on day t, αi is the intercept coefficient 
for firm i, Rmt is the change in the market index (KOSPI) for day t so that βi is the 
estimated market risk coefficient for firm i, and  kit D  is a binary variable that equals one if 
day t is within the three-day event window k and zero otherwise. Hence, equation (1) is 
estimated as a system with a cross-equation equality restriction for the excess returns 
coefficient, k γ , which measures the average daily abnormal returns associated with event 
window k.
6  
In addition, we investigate how abnormal returns are related to observable financial 
characteristics of firms that we hypothesize to be correlated with related lending, namely, 
profitability, liquidity, and reliance on short-term bank loans. If the market participants 
expect that foreign takeover will reduce the extent of related lending, firms that are 
unprofitable, illiquid, and largely dependent on bank loans should be affected more 
adversely by these events. In other words, we expect that events signaling an increase in 
the likelihood of ownership change should have a larger impact on unprofitable, illiquid, 
and bank-dependent firms. For this exercise, we allow the abnormal returns associated 
with each event to depend on three observable characteristics of firms, namely, the return 
on assets (ROA), the ratio of cash plus bank deposits to assets (LIQ), and the ratio of 
short-term bank loans to total assets (LOANS).
7 The regression equation is specified as 
follows: 
                                                 
6 Standard errors are adjusted for contemporaneous correlation in error terms. 
7 To capture the information about firm characteristics available to market participants at the time of an 
announcement, we use a two-year average of each variable. We also estimated the effects using averages of 
the firm characteristics for 1997 through 1999 and found qualitatively similar results.  We report only the 
estimations using two-year averages to represent the information available to market participants at the 
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   (2) 
We expect profitable firms to be affected less by these events because they are better able 
to obtain funds from sources other than their main bank on market terms than are 
unprofitable firms. Hence, θROA,k, which captures the effects of profitability on the 
abnormal return associated with event k, should be positive if event k signals a higher 
likelihood of foreign takeover of main banks but  negative if the event indicates a lower 
likelihood of ownership change. 
Even if lending is reduced after the foreign takeover of the bank, firms with sufficient 
liquidity do not rely as extensively on bank loans. Alternatively, firms with low liquidity 
are more beholden to their main banks for financing. In addition, liquidity is an indication 
of the short-term financial health of the firm.  Hence, as with profitability, we expect 
foreign takeover of main banks to have a smaller impact on liquid firms than illiquid ones; 
i.e. θLIQ,k should be positive for events signaling a higher likelihood of foreign takeover 
and negative for events indicating the opposite. Finally, firms having a large percentage 
of short-term bank loans in their portfolios are more likely to be dependent on their main 
bank for funds.
8  Hence, we expect the reliance on short-term bank loans to magnify the 
impact of an event; i.e. θLOAN,k should be negative if event k signals a higher likelihood of 
foreign takeover and positive for events suggesting the opposite.  In addition, we divide 
the sample into quintiles based on these characteristics and estimate the impact of an 
event on each quintile to determine the distribution of abnormal returns across different 
                                                 
8 Ideally, we would like to include a direct measure of the reliance of the firm on its main bank but no such 
variable is available in the data.   12
types of firms. For these quintile analyses, we expect the impact of an event on abnormal 
returns to be larger for less-profitable, less-liquid, and bank-dependent firms. 
4.  Estimated Abnormal Returns 
4.1 Baseline Model 
The estimated average daily abnormal returns of affiliated firms during the three-day 
event window for the baseline model from equation (1) are reported in column 3 of Table 
2.  The coefficients for the firm-specific intercepts and risk coefficients are omitted to 
keep the table relatively uncluttered. The first event to signal a change in the ownership 
for Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank is the announcement of the nationalization that 
renders the government the majority owner. The abnormal return is negative 2.2%, which 
is statistically significant at the ten percent level. As predicted, investors perceived this 
event as bad news for firms that have close borrowing relationship with these two banks 
in 2000.
9  Similarly, the announcement of a finalized agreement with the IMF that 
commits the Korean government to restructuring these two banks and selling them to 
foreign financial institutions generates a strongly statistically significant negative 2.5% 
abnormal return for related borrowers. In both cases, the anticipated change in ownership 
has the expected negative effect on the stock prices of companies using these banks as a 
main bank.  
The letter of intent that the Korean government signed with IMF includes specific 
steps to be taken to re-privatize Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank. In particular, the first 
                                                 
9 Djankov et al. (2005) find that nationalization leads to a 3% short-term increase in abnormal returns of 
related borrowers for their sample of insolvent banks in three Asian countries.  However, they interpret this 
event differently because they consider nationalized banks to be those that will continue soft lending 
relationships.  For Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank, we consider nationalization to be the first step in 
transferring ownership to a foreign financial institution.  Djankov et al. recognize this expectation by 
classifying both of these Korean banks as foreign owned in their study.    13
requirement is to appoint an outside lead manager for restructuring and preparation for 
privatization. When the Korean government actually took this step on April 22, 1998, 
negative abnormal returns are indicated for related borrowers but the coefficient is not 
statistically significant in column 3 of Table 2. The first setback occurred on November 5, 
1998, when the government announced that the anticipated sales of both Korea First 
Bank and Seoul Bank were postponed. Abnormal returns accruing to related borrowers of 
both banks are estimated to be a strongly statistically significant 2.5%. This evidence 
confirms our hypothesis that news indicating the likely continuation of soft related 
lending will have a positive impact on the value of companies using these banks as their 
main bank.  In addition, the average gain for related borrowers of these banks is equal to 
the loss in value they experienced when the letter of intent with the IMF was finalized.   
After the announcement of a postponement in privatization of the banks, memoranda 
of understanding were signed with two foreign financial institutions, Newbridge Capital 
Group for Korea First Bank and HSBC for Seoul Bank.  The coefficient for this event is 
negative, as expected, but it is not statistically significant.
10  However, when the first 
deadlines stipulated in the memoranda passed without any formal agreement with a 
foreign owner for either bank, related borrowers earned positive abnormal returns of 
1.6%, which are statistically significant at the ten percent level.  A second deadline was 
also missed but the coefficient for this event is not statistically significant perhaps 
because the expectation of a delay had already been captured by the market reaction to 
the first deadline passing without any action. 
                                                 
10 This coefficient and the following two coefficients reflect the impact of the event on the related 
borrowers for each bank in different time periods due to the different dates of the event for each bank.   14
Turning to the events that correspond to the sale of Korea First Bank to Newbridge 
Capital Group, the announcement of the agreement did not have a statistically significant 
effect on related borrowers of this bank.  However, the actual privatization event on 
December 23, 1999 resulted in strongly statistically significant negative abnormal returns 
of 2.3% for companies using Korea First Bank as their main bank in 2000.
11  Taken 
together, these later five events indicate that considerable uncertainty surrounded the sale 
of both banks after the Korean government announced a postponement in privatization 
plans at the beginning of November 1998.  Not until more than a year later when Korea 
First Bank was actually purchased by Newbridge Capital did the market find this bank’s 
change in ownership credible.  At that time, firms using Korea First Bank as their main 
banks lost value on average equal to the value lost during the two first events in 
December 1997 when the banks were nationalized and the letter of intent with the IMF 
was signed. 
4.2. Robustness Checks 
To investigate the strength of the evidence of abnormal returns to related lending, we 
conduct several robustness checks. First, we recognize the possibility that related 
borrowers of Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank may be concentrated in a few industries. 
Without accounting for the performance of industry to which each firm in the sample 
belong, the estimated abnormal returns will have some bias. As a robustness check, we 
include an industry stock index in addition to the market index (KOSPI) in the following 
equation: 
                                                 
11 Only companies using Korea First Bank as their main bank are included in the estimation of this 
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where an industry index, jit R , is the percentage change in the stock index of industry j to 
which firm i belongs. Column 4 of Table 1 reports the estimated coefficients; abnormal 
returns are qualitatively similar to the baseline results with three notable changes.  First, 
the negative coefficient for the announcement of the memorandum of understanding is 
now statistically significant after controlling for industry effects. Second, the coefficients 
associated with nationalization and missing the first deadline take on increased statistical 
significance.  Third, the eventual acquisition of Korea First Bank by Newbridge Capital 
Group no longer yields statistically significant abnormal returns, although its sign 
remains negative. In summary, controlling for industry-specific shocks corroborates and 
strengthens the results in the baseline model except for the attribution of statistically 
significant negative abnormal returns to the final acquisition of Korea First Bank. 
In the baseline model, we assume that the relationship between the stock price of the 
firms and the Korean stock price index (KOSPI) remains the same throughout the entire 
twenty-eight-month period. To allow for the possibility that this relationship may change 
over this period, we divide the sample into four sub-samples, namely, November 1, 1997 
to May 17, 1998; May 18, 1998 to November 24, 1998; November 25, 1998 to July 14, 
1999; and July 15, 1998 to February 29, 2000. Any bias in abnormal returns caused by 
assuming that the firm-specific risk coefficients, i.e.,  αi and βi, are constant over the 
entire period is likely to be less severe when we allow these coefficients to take on 
different values in each of the four periods. Column 5 of Table 2 reports the resulting 
estimates of abnormal returns attributable to the events, which corroborate and strengthen   16
the baseline results. In particular, the negative coefficients for the appointment of Morgan 
Stanley as the outside advisor for the memorandum of understanding become statistically 
significant. In addition, unlike in the previous column, statistically significant negative 
abnormal returns are associated with the final privatization of Korea First Bank.    
Our final robustness check concerns the selection of the sample of related borrowers.  
Although related borrowers tend to stay with their main banks in Korea, the financial 
difficulty of these two banks and the uncertainty about their ownership during the sample 
period resulted in more changes in main-bank relationships for these two banks than for 
the other nationwide banks. As Table A1 indicates, about 65% of related borrowers of 
Korea First Bank and about 80% of related borrowers of Seoul Bank remained with their 
main bank during the entire two-year period. Hence, we have re-run our baseline 
regression taking only the firms that identify Korea First Bank or Seoul Bank as their 
main bank in both 1998 and 2000.  The results reported in column 6 of Table 2 are for 
firms that stayed with their main bank throughout the sample period. A comparison of the 
coefficients in columns 3 and 6 of the table indicates that the group of related borrowers 
has virtually no impact on the estimated abnormal returns associated with the events.  
In summary, our robustness checks indicate that the baseline results capture well the 
impact of the events surrounding the sale of these two Korean banks to foreign owners on 
abnormal returns to related borrowers. The events occurring earlier in the sample period 
have statistically significant coefficients of the expected signs with the exception of the 
appointment of Morgan Stanley as the privatization advisor, an event that may have 
already been anticipated by market participants.  However, the events occurring later in 
the sample period have mainly insignificant coefficients. Market participants do not   17
appear to have taken the memoranda of understanding as credible commitments to the 
rejuvenation of the privation processes. To an extent, subsequent events prove the 
expectations of the market participants to be correct as the first two deadlines specified in 
the memoranda are missed for both banks. One interpretation of the results for the later 
period is that market participants are taking a wait-and-see attitude in which actions 
speak louder than words.  The finding of significant negative abnormal returns to related 
borrowers attributable to the actual privatization of Korea First Bank in the baseline 
model corroborates this view of market expectations.  
5.  The Impact of Firm Characteristics on Abnormal Returns 
Turning to the dependence of the benefits to soft related lending on the type of 
borrower, we examine the impact of each announcement interacted with each of the three 
firm characteristics, namely, profitability, liquidity, and reliance on bank loans. In 
estimating equation (2), we expect to find that unprofitable firms, which may even be 
zombie firms, as well as firms depending more heavily on short-term bank lending are 
affected more by any perceived change in soft lending practices. In addition, we expect to 
find that highly liquid firms are less impacted by these events because they have 
considerable cash flow to substitute for bank financing.  
Table 3 displays the results of the regression based on equation (2) for the baseline 
model.  For each event, the reported intercept coefficient measures abnormal returns if 
the value of each firm characteristic were zero. Hence, the coefficients for each 
characteristic measure the average differential impact on abnormal returns attributable to 
this characteristic in a regression that takes account of the other two characteristics. For 
example, the significant negative coefficient of 6.5 for profitability interacted with sales   18
postponed indicates that more-profitable firms have less increase in abnormal returns on 
average than less-profitable firms when the news indicates a setback in the privatization 
of the banks. Therefore, the coefficients of events interacted with profitability and 
liquidity are expected to have signs opposite to those of the corresponding event, as 
indicated in the first column of Table 3.  In contrast, the coefficients of events interacted 
with reliance on bank loans are expected to have the same signs as those of the 
corresponding event because the abnormal returns of highly dependent firms should be 
affected more seriously by news of either sort.  
Table 3 contains twelve interactive coefficients that are statistically significant at the 
five percent or better level. Of the twelve, ten have the expected signs and seven of these 
are related to three early events, namely nationalization, signing the letter of intent, and 
the postponement of sales, that have robust significant abnormal returns associated with 
them in Table 2.  The two unexpected signs on statistically significant coefficients in 
Table 3 are associated with the actual acquisition of Korea First Bank.  With respect to 
the firm characteristics, bank reliance has the most coefficients that are both statistically 
significant and of the expected sign at 5, followed by profitability with 3, and liquidity 
with 2. To check again for robustness, we estimate the same equations with an additional 
control for industry index, with the sample divided into four sub-periods to allow for 
different firm-specific risk coefficients, and with only firms that stayed with each bank 
during the entire sample period included.  Tables A2, A3, and A4 in the Appendix 
present the results. Although the interactive coefficients are somewhat fragile to the 
different specifications, seven of the twelve significant coefficients in Table 3 are robust 
to these changes. Moreover, the two coefficients with unexpected signs in the last column   19
of Table 3 lose their statistical significance in the other specifications. The statistical 
significance of four of the six remaining significant coefficients in the last row is retained 
in all specifications. Hence, we find strong support for the hypothesis that borrowers 
relying more heavily on their main bank for financing are affected more by these events.  
In addition, we find some evidence that more profitable and more liquid firms lose less 
value from negative news but also gain less value from positive news.  
To probe further the relative impact of these events on borrowers of different types, 
we re-estimate equation (1) with dummy variables added to identify quintiles for each 
firm characteristic. Using the baseline model, we investigate whether the abnormal 
returns of the best firms, i.e., those in the fifth quintile with respect to profitability or 
liquidity, actually react differently from the rest of the firms to news about the likely 
continuation or not of soft related lending.  Table 4 reports the results for the dummy 
variables based on liquidity; we expect to find less impact on abnormal returns as 
liquidity increases.  This pattern is discernable for the first two events only.  Focusing on 
the statistically significant coefficients, the distribution for the first setback resembles a 
roller coaster and the distribution for the final privatization of Korea First Bank is U-
shaped. Finally, we find no statistically significant sign reversals with respect to liquidity. 
Table A5 in the Appendix contains the results for the dummy variables based on quintiles 
of profitability.  The notable differences are a somewhat roller-coaster distribution for 
nationalization, the expected distribution for the postponement of sales with the exception 
of the fifth quintile, a reasonably normal distribution for missing the first deadline, and 
the opposite-from-expected pattern for the acquisition of Korea First Bank.  Once again, 
no sign reversal is statistically significant at the 5% or better level.   20
Table A6 in the Appendix presents the results for the dummy variables based on bank 
reliance.  We expect to find more impact on abnormal returns in higher quintiles because 
firms are more beholden to their main bank.  This pattern is clearly discernible for two 
events that signal setbacks for privatization, namely, sales postponed and first deadline 
missed.  Less strongly, the pattern appears for the first two steps, i.e., nationalization and 
letter of intent, and for the memoranda of understanding.  More importantly, we find two 
statistically significant coefficients exhibiting sign reversals. Specifically, for firms in the 
first quintile, abnormal returns attributable to missing the second deadline are negative 
and, for firms in the third quintile using Korea First Bank as their main bank, abnormal 
returns are positive. In addition, the final privatization of Korea First Bank has more 
impact on abnormal returns for firms that are less reliant on this bank, which is counter to 
our expectation.  
Combining the results in the last row of these three tables yields some insight into 
firms using Korea First Bank as their main bank.  Abnormal returns are impacted more 
strongly by news for firms that are more profitable, less reliant on the bank, and in ether 
of the tails of the liquidity distribution.  Clearly, the firms associated with Korea First 
Bank in 2000 have special characteristics that cause their abnormal returns to respond in 
an unexpected manner to news about the privatization of the bank.  Perhaps, this 
phenomenon is due to the type of firm that becomes associated with Korea First Bank 
during the sample period. Table A1 indicates that 22% of the firms that consider Korea 
First Bank to be their main bank in 2000 were not associated with the bank in 1998.  We 
compared the means of the three characteristics for firms that were associated with Korea 
First Bank for the entire sample period, i.e., old firms, and those that joined the bank   21
during the period, i.e., new firms.  New firms have higher profitability, more liquidity, 
and less reliance on the bank compared with old firms.  Although the last of these 
comparisons is expected, the first two suggest that Korea First Bank was attracting 
financially better firms during the sample period.  This observation may also explain the 
unexpected signs in the last column of Table 3. Any further analysis of these firms 
requires data from the period following the privatization of Korea First Bank. 
 
6.  Conclusion: Globalizing the Korean Banking Sector   
In return for emergency short-term support during the 1997 financial crisis, the IMF 
required the Korean government to allow majority foreign ownership of large nationwide 
banks. In this paper, we provide indirect evidence that the IMF’s insistence that two large, 
insolvent nationwide banks be sold to foreign financial institutions was influential in 
restraining the practice of soft related lending by these banks. For firms that identify 
Korea First Bank or Seoul Bank as their main bank, we find that events signaling strongly 
a change of management and a sale of a bank to a foreign financial institution yield an 
average decrease of about 2% in the stock price of related borrowers over a three-day 
window surrounding the event. In addition, we find that events indicating clearly a 
setback in the Korean government’s ability to sell these two banks to foreign investors 
generate an increase in the stock price of related borrowers of about the same magnitude.  
Our results are consistent with the literature in which related lending is asserted to 
provide rent to borrowers in a main bank financial system. The magnitude of our 
estimated abnormal returns is roughly comparable to the average decline in the stock 
prices of companies affiliated with a main bank experiencing financial difficulty found by   22
Bae et al. (2002) in the pre-financial crisis period in Korea.  In summary, the evidence 
indicates that Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank were engaged in soft related lending and 
that selling these banks to a foreign owner was perceived by market participants in Korea 
as putting an end to such non-commercial behavior. Moreover, we find some evidence to 
support our hypotheses that these events had larger impacts on abnormal returns for firms 
that are more unprofitable, less liquid, and more reliant of their main bank.  Taken 
together, these results support the claim that the previous owners and managers of these 
two Korean banks engaged in soft related lending practices and, perhaps, kept afloat 
zombie insolvent firms.  
Several policy implications can be drawn from our analysis.  First, rents to firms 
involved in a relationship with a main bank can be considerable.  However, to what 
extent these rents are attributable to soft, non-market, contractual terms or to relationship-
specific surplus is difficult to determine directly. Analyzing the impact of news events 
concerning the likelihood of the sale of a main bank to a foreign institution on abnormal 
returns of related borrowers provides only indirect evidence of the softness of related 
lending.  Second, the Korean stock market appears to process information relatively 
efficiently. We infer that market participants anticipate that foreign control of a main 
bank will end soft related lending practices because the stock price of related borrowers 
responds considerably to news indicating that such an event is more or less likely to 
occur.  Third, credible market discipline can be established by the sale of a bank to a 
foreign institution in an emerging market economy in which relational lending has 
become common practice for domestic banks. However, finding a willing foreign 
purchaser is not easy.   23
After mid-1999, the fates of the two Korean banks take different paths.  Seoul Bank 
was not sold to a foreign investor because HSBC lost interest.  The Korean government 
arranged the takeover of Seoul Bank by Hana Bank, another large nationwide domestic 
Korean bank, in November 2002.  As part of the privatization agreement for Korea First 
Bank, Newbridge Capital Group, which is not a bank, was required to hold its shares for 
five years.  In April 2005, Newbridge exercised its exit option by selling a majority stake 
in the bank to Standard Chartered Bank of London for $3.3 billion U.S. dollars.  
Interestingly, the new owner outbid HSBC for Korea First Bank. Clearly, Newbridge 
Capital Group played an important intermediary role in preparing Korea First Bank for its 
eventual sale to a foreign bank. As a final lesson, governments in emerging market 
economies interested in selling a domestic bank to a foreign bank should not reject offers 
from non-bank foreign financial institutions because these institutions are able to provide 
the credibility necessary to clean up lending practices in preparation for the eventual sale 
of the bank to a foreign bank.   24
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Table 1: Relevant Events  




December 9, 1997 
 
Korean government became the majority 
owner of Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank 
and promised stringent restructuring of the 
banks with 1,500 workers to be laid off. 
 
December 26, 1997  Korean government and the IMF agreed on 
the letter of intent, which aims at prompt 
restructuring and eventual sales of Korea 
First Bank and Seoul Bank to foreign 
banks.  
 
April 22, 1998  Korean government appointed Morgan 
Stanley as a lead manager for restructuring 
and privatization. 
 
November 5, 1998  Korean government postponed the sales of 
Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank due to 
the difficulty in obtaining foreign bids. 
 
December 28, 1998  Korean government signed the 
memorandum of understanding with 
Newbridge Capital for the sale of Korea 
First Bank. 
 
February 22, 1999   Korean government signed the 
memorandum of understanding with HSBC 
for the sale of Seoul Bank. 
 
April 30, 1999 (Korea First Bank)  
May 31, 1999 (Seoul Bank) 
Korean government failed to reach any 
agreement with foreign institutions by the 
first deadline.  
 
May 12, 1999 (Korea First Bank)  
June 28, 1999 (Seoul Bank) 
Korean government failed to reach any 
agreement with foreign institutions by the 
second deadline. 
 
July 1, 1999  Korean government agreed with 
Newbridge on the sale of Korea First Bank 
 
December 23, 1999  Newbridge acquired 51% of Korea First 
Bank’s share.   26
Table 2: Estimated Abnormal Returns 
 
The multiple regression models are estimated with ordinary least squares. The standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across firms using STATA’s cluster option. The dependent 
variable is the daily percentage change in stock price of firms whose main bank is reported to be either Korea First 
Bank or Seoul Bank. Firm-specific intercepts and risk coefficients are included but not reported to keep the table 













Nationalization  -  -2.203* -2.000***  -1.798*** -2.226* 
    (1.182) (0.576) (0.315) (1.136) 
Letter of Intent   -  -2.448*** -1.579*** -2.467*** -2.472*** 
with IMF    (0.791) (0.579) (0.303) (0.775) 
Morgan Stanley   -  -1.087  -0.455 -0.821*** -1.057 
Appointed    (0.939) (0.460) (0.302) (0.920) 
Sales Postponed  +  2.537*** 2.299*** 2.384*** 2.285*** 
    (0.728) (0.679) (0.315) (0.699) 
Memorandum of 
Understanding 
























Agreement to   -  0.223 -0.123 -0.000 0.531 
Sell KFB    (0.624) (0.191) (0.457) (0.650) 
Acquisition   -  -2.335** -1.402  -1.799***  -2.068* 
of  KFB    (0.955) (0.879) (0.464) (1.061) 
Adjusted R-sq    0.13  0.20    0.13 
 
R-squares are 0.25, 0.13, 0.12, and 0.06 for four separate sample periods 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   27
Table 3: Differential Effects of Events (Baseline Model) 
 
The multiple regression models are estimated with ordinary least squares. The standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across firms using STATA’s cluster option. The dependent 
variable is the daily percentage change in stock price of firms whose main bank is reported to be either Korea First 
Bank or Seoul Bank. Firm-specific intercepts and risk coefficients are included but not reported to keep the table 
































Intercept -1.756  -
2.512*** 
-0.815 3.868***  -1.153  0.874 0.154 -1.122**  -0.916* 
  (3.297)  (0.539) (1.080) (0.307)  (1.850)  (0.705) (0.828) (0.497)  (0.522) 
               
Profitability -2.094 1.455***  1.182  -6.485*** 0.070  0.089  -3.493** 1.848  -5.849*** 
(opposite) (2.996)  (0.435) (1.039) (0.437)  (2.539)  (1.617) (1.392) (4.255)  (2.128) 
               
Liquidity 10.378  11.993**  6.391*  -
10.820*** 
3.425 -5.634  2.211  7.678  -6.326 
(opposite) (9.098)  (5.751) (3.731) (1.525)  (5.040)  (4.032) (3.198) (5.808)  (7.741) 









5.633*** 2.299*  4.904** 3.064** 2.247  5.782*** 
(same)  (1.121)  (0.795) (1.363) (1.433)  (1.350)  (2.051) (1.398) (6.306)  (1.954) 
               
 
R-square is 0.15. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Table 4: Estimated Abnormal Returns for Firms with Varying Liquidity (Baseline) 
 
The multiple regression models are estimated with ordinary least squares. The standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across firms using STATA’s cluster option. The dependent 
variable is the daily percentage change in stock price of firms whose main bank is reported to be either Korea First 
Bank or Seoul Bank in 2000. Firm-specific intercepts and risk coefficients are included but not reported to keep the 
table relatively uncluttered.  
 










Nationalization (-)  -2.668 -3.224***  -3.184 -0.575  -1.454* 
    (1.686) (1.190) (2.089) (0.588)  (0.767) 
Letter of Intent   (-)  -3.083***  -3.315*** -2.300*  -1.849*  -1.676 
with  IMF    (0.637) (0.514) (1.390) (1.068)  (1.132) 
Morgan Stanley   (-)  -1.041  -0.987  -2.084*  -0.113  -1.213 
Appointed    (0.760) (0.785) (1.072) (0.527)  (1.860) 
Sales Postponed  (+)  3.085***  1.331**  2.849***  1.324*  4.097*** 
    (0.635) (0.581) (0.630) (0.705)  (1.494) 
Memorandum of   (-)  -0.281  -1.162***  -0.837  0.584  -1.122* 
Understanding    (1.071) (0.220) (0.840) (0.421)  (0.647) 
1st Deadline  (+)  0.801  2.433**  1.089  1.763**  2.024 
    (0.933) (1.037) (0.979) (0.884)  (1.279) 
2nd Deadline  (+)  -0.638  0.132  -0.330  -0.054  -0.362 
    (0.908) (0.670) (0.462) (0.706)  (1.160) 
Agreement to   (-)  -0.118  0.889  -1.006  1.004  0.620 
Sell  KFB    (0.636) (0.863) (0.957) (0.782)  (1.707) 
Acquisition   (-)  -2.240*  -3.280***  -0.558  -2.846***  -3.118** 
of  KFB    (1.317) (0.507) (2.360) (0.678)  (1.538) 
 
R-square is 0.13. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   29
Table A1:  Main Bank Relationships:  Number of Firms for Each Bank 
  
       Main  Bank:2000             
Main Bank:1998                       
  CHOHUNG     HANA    HANVIT  KOOKMIN   KORAM       KEB      KFB  PEACE    SEOUL   SHINHAN Other 
 Totals: 
1998 
                      
CHOHUNG  76 2 5 0 2 2 1 0 1 2 5 96
HANA   0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
HANVIT   1 2 172 0 1 3 7 0 3 2 4 195
KOOKMIN   0 0 2 51 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
KORAM   2 0 1 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 19
KEB 4 0 3 0 0 62 1 0 0 1 3 74
KFB 1 0 12 0 4 3 54 0 0 2 7 83
PEACE   0 0 1 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 1
SEOUL   1 0 5 1 0 1 2 0 45 2 2 59
SHINHAN   1 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 21 1 28
Other 3 1 6 0 1 1 2 1 2 3  20
                      
Totals: 2000  89 8 208 7 25 73 69 1 52 34 22 566
 
 
Source: Korea Company Information 1998 and 2000  30
 Table A2: Differential Effects of Events (Industry Index Added) 
 
The multiple regression models are estimated with ordinary least squares. The standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across firms using STATA’s cluster option. The dependent 
variable is the daily percentage change in stock price of firms whose main bank is reported to be either Korea First 
Bank or Seoul Bank. Firm-specific intercepts and risk coefficients are included but not reported to keep the table 
































Intercept -2.605  -1.545**  0.038  3.603***  -1.783  0.461 0.194 -0.992*  -0.601 
 (2.175)  (0.633)  (0.345)  (0.359)  (1.588)  (0.557)  (0.588)  (0.560)  (1.115) 
                 
Profitability 0.987  0.220  1.216*  -6.545***  1.882 0.659 -3.329** 1.619  -3.786 
(opposite) (1.950) (0.764) (0.631) (1.066)  (1.908)  (1.402) (1.321) (3.914)  (3.764) 
                 
Liquidity 12.925* 9.908*  2.251  -
10.399*** 
3.328 -5.449  2.166  2.548  -9.245 
(opposite) (6.920) (5.879) (2.124) (1.947)  (4.919)  (4.359) (3.324) (4.128)  (6.366) 









6.232*** 1.595  5.058***  3.859**  1.466  6.455** 
(same) (1.354)  (0.965)  (1.131)  (1.742)  (1.658)  (1.862)  (1.685)  (7.405) (2.765) 
                 
 
R-square is 0.22. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    31
Table A3: Differential Effects of Events (Four Sub-Periods) 
 
The multiple regression models are estimated with ordinary least squares. The standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across firms using STATA’s cluster option. The dependent 
variable is the daily percentage change in stock price of firms whose main bank is reported to be either Korea First 
Bank or Seoul Bank. Firm-specific intercepts and risk coefficients are included but not reported to keep the table 
































Intercept -1.634  -2.265**  -0.673 3.691*** -1.376 0.510  -0.147  -1.564  -0.426 
 (1.117)  (1.091)  (1.083)  (0.993)  (1.104)  (1.132)  (1.140)  (1.590)  (1.633) 
                  
Profitability -1.691  0.716  1.193  -6.180*** 0.365  0.500  -3.129  0.661  -6.067 
(opposite) (2.297)  (2.262)  (2.260) (2.081)  (2.318)  (2.642)  (2.650)  (4.507)  (4.573) 
                  
Liquidity 11.124**  10.417**  6.064  -10.661**  3.609 -5.213  1.847  12.833  -5.945 
(opposite) (4.733)  (4.673)  (4.849) (4.649)  (5.022)  (4.999)  (5.037)  (10.266)  (10.428) 





-4.313* 5.538**  2.083  4.757*  2.918  2.420  5.582 
(same) (2.433) (2.314)  (2.338)  (2.528) (2.767)  (2.763)  (2.791)  (3.902)  (3.998) 
                  
 
R-squares are 0.26, 0.16, 0.13, and 0.07 for four separate sample periods 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table A4: Differential Effects of Events (Firms That Stayed with Banks) 
 
The multiple regression models are estimated with ordinary least squares. The standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across firms using STATA’s cluster option. The dependent 
variable is the daily percentage change in stock price of firms whose main bank is reported to be either Korea First 
Bank or Seoul Bank. Firm-specific intercepts and risk coefficients are included but not reported to keep the table 
































Intercept -1.674  -2.259***  -0.572  2.113*** -1.281 0.997** -0.389  -0.584  -1.965 
  (2.729) (0.507) (0.892) (0.432) (1.321)  (0.485)  (0.539) (1.188)  (1.599) 
              
Profitability -5.454*  -0.816  2.189***  -6.387*** -0.649  -0.076 -3.133**  2.046  -5.628 
(opposite) (2.992) (0.791) (0.749) (0.647) (2.991)  (1.200)  (1.278) (6.689)  (6.069) 
              
Liquidity 8.507  14.177***  6.544*  -9.368***  5.210 -5.222  3.106  6.303  -7.753 
(opposite) (9.229) (5.243) (3.348) (1.819) (4.958)  (3.259)  (3.515) (6.151)  (12.090) 
              
Reliance on 
Bank Loans 
-1.071 -5.690***  -
5.651*** 
7.649*** 3.532***  4.068*  2.018  2.011  7.405 
(same)  (1.186) (0.719) (1.399) (1.563) (0.939)  (2.259)  (1.384) (7.624)  (6.921) 
              
 
R-square is 0.14. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    33
Table A5: Estimated Abnormal Returns with Varying Profitability (Baseline) 
 
The multiple regression models are estimated with ordinary least squares. The standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across firms using STATA’s cluster option. The dependent 
variable is the daily percentage change in stock price of firms whose main bank is reported to be either Korea First 
Bank or Seoul Bank. Firm-specific intercepts and risk coefficients are included but not reported to keep the table 
relatively uncluttered.  
 










Nationalization  (-) -1.842  -2.924*  -1.537**  -2.959***  -1.765** 
    (1.814) (1.637) (0.693) (1.076)  (0.707) 
Letter of Intent   (-) -3.722*** -2.857*** -1.251  -2.658***  -1.742 
with IMF    (1.014) (0.748) (0.903) (0.408)  (1.136) 
Morgan Stanley   (-)  -1.489 -1.505**  -0.337 -0.830  -1.256 
Appointed    (1.095) (0.706) (0.348) (1.200)  (1.607) 
Sales Postponed  (+)  3.680*** 3.165*** 1.241*** 1.420* 3.140*** 
    (0.775) (0.579) (0.373) (0.853)  (1.149) 
Memorandum of   (-) -0.898  0.482  0.054  -2.680***  0.354 
Understanding    (1.399) (0.893) (0.239) (0.596)  (0.649) 
1st Deadline  (+) 0.838  1.499**  2.247***  1.839*  1.689 
    (1.404) (0.612) (0.862) (1.106)  (1.308) 
2nd Deadline  (+) 0.284  0.067  -0.010  -1.132*  -0.462 
    (0.816) (0.744) (0.598) (0.583)  (0.923) 
Agreement to   (-) -0.449  -0.735  0.364  0.783  1.159 
Sell KFB    (0.476) (1.200) (0.492) (0.573)  (2.051) 
Acquisition   (-)  -1.722 -2.185 -0.918 -3.492***  -3.452** 
of KFB    (1.065) (1.779) (1.385) (0.632)  (1.544) 
 
R-square is 0.13. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    34
Table A6: Estimated Abnormal Returns Varying Bank Reliance (Baseline) 
 
The multiple regression models are estimated with ordinary least squares. The standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across firms using STATA’s cluster option. The dependent 
variable is the daily percentage change in stock price of firms whose main bank is reported to be either Korea First 
Bank or Seoul Bank. Firm-specific intercepts and risk coefficients are included but not reported to keep the table 
relatively uncluttered.  
 










Nationalization (-)  -1.478*  -3.009*  -1.682 -2.857*  -2.008** 
    (0.883) (1.678) (1.025) (1.584)  (0.966) 
Letter of Intent   (-)  -0.705  -2.860** -2.248***  -3.358***  -2.997*** 
with  IMF    (0.623) (1.380) (0.445) (1.140)  (0.729) 
Morgan Stanley   (-)  -0.167  -0.741  -1.450*  -1.664  -1.464 
Appointed    (0.308) (1.058) (0.789) (1.104)  (1.740) 
Sales Postponed  (+)  0.649  1.607**  1.532***  4.423***  4.540** 
    (0.745) (0.741) (0.232) (0.590)  (1.793) 
Memorandum of   (-)  0.094  -1.635***  -0.837***  -0.198  -0.303 
Understanding    (0.802) (0.625) (0.319) (0.982)  (0.615) 
1st Deadline  (+)  0.728  -0.235  2.102  2.675**  2.952*** 
    (0.603) (0.680) (1.346) (1.254)  (1.062) 
2nd  Deadline  (+)  -0.884***  -0.160 -0.330 0.699  -0.571 
    (0.303) (0.807) (0.636) (0.894)  (1.094) 
Agreement to   (-)  -0.041  -0.227  0.849***  0.087  0.462 
Sell  KFB    (1.476) (0.491) (0.180) (0.389)  (1.041) 
Acquisition   (-)  -3.121***  -2.686***  -2.576**  -1.718  -1.694 
of  KFB    (1.130) (0.770) (1.130) (1.830)  (2.097) 
 
R-square is 0.13. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 